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Abstract. Memory corruption attacks may lead to complete takeover of systems.
There are numerous works offering protection mechanisms for this important
problem. But the security guarantees that are offered by most works are only
heuristic and, furthermore, most solutions are designed for protecting the local
memory. In this paper we initiate the study of provably secure remote memory
attestation; we concentrate on provably detecting heap-based overflow attacks
and consider the setting where we aim to protect the memory in a remote system.
We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs (but
all solutions are efficient enough for practical use as our implementation shows)
that detect the presence of injected malicious code or data in remotely-stored
heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class
of attacks, our novel formalization of threat models is general enough to cover a
wide range of attacks and settings.
1 Introduction
Memory corruption attacks are among the most common techniques used to take control
of arbitrary programs. These attacks allow an adversary to exploit running programs
either by injecting their own code or diverting program’s execution, often giving the
adversary complete control over the compromised program. While this class of exploits
is classically embodied in the buffer overflow attack, many other instantiations exist,
including use-after-free vulnerabilities and heap overflow. The latter is the focus of our
work. Without question, this problem is of great importance and has been extensively
studied by the security community.
Existing solutions (such as Stack and heap canaries [14, 17, 19, 31] or address
space layout randomization (ASLR) [27, 37], etc.) vary greatly in terms of security
guarantees, performance, utilized resources (software or hardware-based), etc. While
these techniques are implemented and deployed in many systems to prevent a number of
attacks in practice, their constructions are only appropriate in the context of local systems:
for example, an authority checking the integrity of heap canaries, has to monitor every
single step of the program’s execution. However, this requirement is making the existing
heap-based protection schemes hardly applicable to remote memory attestation where
the authority might reside outside of a local machine. For example, a straight-forward
construction to keep track of all locations of heap canaries and validate their integrity
upon request not only incurs noticeable performance overheads, but also requires a
trusted communication channel between the program and a remote verifier.
More critically, none of the prior works targeting heap overflow attacks provided
provable security guarantees. Without a clear adversarial model it is hard to judge
the scope of the protection, and often the attackers, who are getting more and more
sophisticated, are still able to bypass many such mitigation techniques.
Proving that a given protocol can resist all possible attacks within a certain well-
defined class is the gold standard in modern cryptography. However, protocols that are
provably secure are rather rarely used in real systems either because they commonly
target extremely strong security definitions and hence are too slow for practical use, or
they rely on impractical assumptions about attackers. Our work tries to bridge this gap in
the context of remote attestation by designing practical protocols with provable security
guarantees against realistic threats and satisfying practical system requirements. Our
treatment utilizes the formal provable-security approach of modern cryptography that
works hand in hand with applied systems expertise.
In this paper, we realized our theoretical findings as a working prototype system
that can mitigate, (still limited), heap overflow attacks in applications running remotely
outside of user’s local computer. Although the current implementation therefore focuses
on protecting user’s programs running on the cloud environment or firmware running
outside of the main CPU, the proposed security model is general enough to be useful
for future works addressing other classes of adversaries. We now discuss our focus and
contributions in more detail.
OUR FOCUS. Our focus is on the remote verification setting, motivated by the widespread
use of cloud computing. In our setting, two entities participate in the protocol; a program
that is potentially vulnerable, and a remote verifier who attests the state of the program’s
memory (e.g., heap). This setting is particularly useful for verifying the integrity of
software that is deployed and runs outside of a local machine: a deployed program on
the cloud is one example, and a firmware running outside of the main CPU is another
example. Note that if the cloud is completely untrusted, we cannot guarantee security
without relying on secure hardware (and our focus is software-based solution only).
Hence we need to trust the cloud to a certain degree, but at the same time we want to
avoid changing the operating system there. Since we do not trust the program which is
potentially malicious, we create another entity, a wrapper, that is not directly affected
by the program, unless an adversary bypasses the protection boundary provided by an
operating system.
In practice, system software (e.g., browser or operating system) is vulnerable to
memory corruptions because it heavily relies on unsafe low-level programming languages
like C for either performance or compatibility reasons. As we mentioned, we do not
attempt to prevent entire classes of memory corruption attacks (e.g., use-after-free or bad-
casting) nor exploitation techniques (e.g., return-oriented programming (ROP)) with one
system. We only consider one particular type of memory corruption attack that overwrites
a consecutive region of memory (e.g., buffer) to compromise a control-sensitive data
structure (e.g., function pointer or virtual function table). However, we believe such
memory corruptions are still very common (e.g., the recent GHOST vulnerability in
GLibc [4]), and become more important in the cloud setting where we have to rely on
the cloud provider.
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Within this scope, our goal is to find solutions that (1) provide provable security
guarantees and (2) are practically efficient.
RMA SECURITY DEFINITION. Providing security guarantees is not possible without
having a well-defined security model. We start with defining a remote memory attestation
(RMA) protocol, whose goal is protecting the integrity of a program’s data memory (e.g.,
heap). It is basically an interactive challenge-response protocol between a prover and
a verifier, which is initialized by a setup algorithm that embeds a secret known to the
verifier into a program’s memory. The goal of the verifier is to detect memory corruptions.
Next we propose the first security model for RMA protocols. The definition is one
of our main contributions. Our model captures various adversarial capabilities (what
attackers know and can do), reflecting real security threats. We assume that an attacker
can have some a-priori knowledge of the memory’s contents (e.g., binary itself) and can
learn parts of it, adaptively, over time.
Since we target a setting where the communication between the prover and the verifier
is over untrusted channels, we let the adversary observe the legitimate communication
between the prover and the verifier. Moreover, we let it impersonate either party and
assume it can modify or substitute their messages with those of its choice. To model
malicious writes to the memory we allow the attacker to tamper the memory. The goal
of the attacker is to make the verifier accept at a point where the memory is corrupted.
We note that on the one hand no security may be possible if an attacker’s queries are
unrestricted and on the other we would like to avoid hardwiring in the model a particular
set of restrictions on these queries. Accordingly we state security with respect to abstract
classes of functions that model the read and write capabilities of the attackers. This
allows us to keep the definition very general. We leave it for the theorem statements
that state the security of particular protocols to specify these classes, and thus define the
scope of attacks the protocol defends against.
To prevent against the aforementioned GHOST attack [4] where a read (e.g., infor-
mation leak) follows by write to the same location and leaves the key intact, any solution
in our setting needs to perform a periodic key refresh. Our protocol definition and the
security model take this into account. But of course, we do not guarantee security if the
attack happens within a refresh time window. This is a common caveat with preventing
timing attacks.
An RMA protocol proven to satisfy our security definition for specific read and
write capabilities classes would guaranty security against any efficient attacker with such
practical restrictions, under reasonable computational assumptions. This is in contrast
to previous schemes, which were only argued to protect against certain specific attacks,
informally.
PROVABLY-SECURE RMA CONSTRUCTIONS. The idea underlying our solutions is
simple and resembles the one behind stack or heap canaries. We embed secrets throughout
the memory and, for attestation, we verify that they are intact. This is similar to how
canaries are used, but for the setting where the verifier is remote the ideas need to
be adapted. A simple but illustrative example is the protocol where the prover simply
sends to the verifier the hash of all of the (concatenated) canaries. Here, the attacker
can replay this value after modifying the memory. The following discussion illustrates
3
further potential weaknesses of this protocol uncovered when trying to derive provable
security guarantees.
For clarity, instead of calling the secrets canaries, let us refer to the secrets we embed
in the memory as shares, i.e., we split a secret into multiple shares and spread them out
in memory. For now, let’s assume for simplicity that the shares are embedded at equal
intervals. Then an adversary who injects malicious code, and hence writes a string that
is at least one-block long, will over-write at least one share, even if it knows the shares’
locations. Verification just checks whether the original secret can be reconstructed and
used in a simple challenge-response protocol that prevents re-plays. For example, the
verifier could send a random challenge, and the prover would reply with the hash of the
reconstructed secret and the challenge. Note that the prover will run in a totally separate
memory space so the secrecy of the reconstructed key at time of verification is not an
issue.
We note that our solution does not readily apply for the stack because the stack
doesn’t have explicit unit or boundaries to statically place secret shares), unlike the heap
that has a unit (a page) of allocation that makes the key placement efficient and easy.
The standard security of an n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme ensures that unless
the attacker reads all memory (and in this case no security can be ensured anyway), the
key is information-theoretically hidden. However, the adversary could read and then
tamper the memory while leaving the share intact. To mitigate this, the periodic updates
could re-randomize all shares, while keeping the same secret. The size of the blocks
and the frequency of the updates are the parameters that particular applications could
choose for the required tradeoff between security and efficiency. In the ideal setting,
we would refresh the shares whenever the leakage of a share happens. However, since
the occurrence of such events is not always clear, the alternative solution of refreshing
“often" enough may lead to unreasonable overheads. In our current implementation, we
keep the frequency of updates a parameter and developers can simply incorporate timing
that reflect realistic assumptions on the adversary in our implementation.
Although the solution approach seems simple and sound, it turns out that assessing
its security and practicality raises numerous subtleties and complications, both from the
systems and cryptographic points of view. For example, our system can not fix the size of
memory object, which naturally underutilizes the memory space (e.g., de-fragmentation).
In our system, we support various memory slots for allocation, from the smallest 8 byte
objects incrementally to over 100 mega bytes, depending on the user’s configuration.
The obvious choice for producing the secrets to be embedded in the memory is to
use an n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme as a building block for our constructions. It
turns out however, that the standard security of secret sharing schemes is not sufficient to
guarantee the security of the protocol. First, we have to extend the security definition to
take into account key updates. The attacker should be able to access the whole memory
as long as it does not do it in between consecutive updates. The extended notion is known
as proactive secret sharing [20]. Also, for the proof we need the additional properties
that modifying at least one share implies changing a secret, and one extra property we
discuss later. Fortunately, all these properties are satisfied by a simple XOR-based secret
sharing scheme.
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We show that combing the simple XOR-based secret sharing scheme (or any
generic secret sharing scheme with some extra properties we define) and the hash-based
challenge-response protocol yields a secure and efficient RMA protocol, for attackers
with restricted, but quite reasonable abilities to read and tamper the memory. The proof
we provide relies on the random oracle (RO) model [8]. Since the RO is unsound [12]
for security-critical applications it may be desirable to have protocols which provably
provide guarantees in the standard (RO devoid) model.
An intuitively appealing solution is to employ some symmetric-key identification
protocol, e.g., replying with a message authentication code (MAC) of the random
challenge, where the MAC is keyed with the reconstructed secret. However, given the
capabilities that we ascribe to realistic adversaries, a formal proof would require a MAC
secure in the presence of some leakage on and tampering of the secret key. The latter
property is also known as security against related key attacks (RKA) [6]. Unfortunately,
there are no suitable leakage and tamper-resilient MACs for a wide class of leakage
and tampering functions, as the existing solutions, e.g. [5, 10], only address specific
algebraic classes of tampering functions and are rather inefficient.
Perhaps unexpectedly, we consider a challenge response protocol based on a public
key encryption scheme – the verifier sends a random challenge and expects an encryption
of the challenge together with the (reconstructed) secret. This solution requires that the
public key of the verifier is stored so that it is accessible by the prover, and cannot be
tampered (otherwise we would need a public-key scheme secure with respect to related
public key attacks, and similarly to the symmetric setting, there are no provably secure
schemes wrt this property, except for few works addressing a narrow class of tamper
functions [7, 38]).
To ensure non-malleability of the public key, our system separates the memory
space of a potentially malicious program from its prover (e.g., different processes), and
store its public key in the prover’s memory space. Since the verification procedure is
unidirectional (e.g., a prover accesses the program’s memory), our system can guarantee
the non-malleability of the public key in practice (e.g., unless no remote memory
overwriting or privilege escalation). This level of security is afforded by deployed
computational platforms (e.g. MMU commodity processors).
It is natural to expect some form of non-malleability from the encryption scheme.
Otherwise, the attacker could modify a legitimate response for one challenge into another
valid one for the same key and a new challenge. An IND-CCA secure encryption such
as Cramer Shoup [15] could work for us. We note however that IND-CCA secure
is an overkill for our application since we do not need to protect against arbitrary
maulings of the ciphertext; instead, the attacker only needs to produce a valid ciphertext
for a particular message, known to the verifier. We show that an encryption scheme
secure against a weaker notion of plaintext-checking attacks [32] is sufficient for us.
Accordingly, we use the "Short" Cramer-Shoup (SCS) scheme proposed and analyzed
very recently by Abdalla et al. [1]. This allows us to save communication one group
element compared to regular Cramer Shoup. We discuss that one can optimize further
and save an additional group element in the communication by slightly increasing
computation.
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IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS. To demonstrate the feasibility of RMA, we implemented a
prototype system that supports arbitrary programs without any modification (e.g., tested
with popular software with a large codebase, such as Firefox, Thunderbird and SPEC
Benchmark). Our evaluation shows that the prototype incurs very small performance
overheads and detects heap-based memory corruptions with the remote verifier.
In a bit more detail, we implemented both, the hash- and encryption-based, protocols.
Interestingly, both protocols showed similar performance, despite the latter one relying
on public key operations, which are much slower than a hash computation. This is
because the significant part of the performance overhead comes from the implementation
of the custom memory allocator, side-effects of memory fragmentation and network
bandwidth, which all make the differences in times of crypto operations insignificant.
RELATED WORK. The works that is perhaps closest in spirit and application domain to
ours is by Francillon et al. [18] who address the problem of remote device attestation.
Their approach is also based on provable security, but consider a significantly weaker
model where the adversary not tamper or read parts of the internal memory of the device.
These are key features of the adversary that we aim to defend against.
Canaries are random values placed throughout a stack or heap, which are later
checked by the kernel. Canary-based protection has been adopted to prevent stack
smashing [2]: e.g., ProPolice [17], StackGuard [14], StackGhost [19]. Similarly, canaries
(or guard as a general form) have been used for heap protection, in particular metadata
of heap [33, 39] (e.g., double free): HeapShield [9] or AddressSanitizer [34]. These
solutions do not immediately work in our setting. This is mainly because all canaries
need to be sent and checked by the remote verifier without leaking or without being
compromised by an adversary. While heavy solutions like employing secure channels
(e.g. TLS) would help mitigate this problem, the resulting system would need to transfer
large quantities of data, making it unsuitable for practical use.
Our solutions could be viewed as a novel variant of “compact” cryptographic canaries,
suitable for remote setting and providing provable security guarantees under precisely
defined threat models.
Software-based attestation has been explored in various contexts: peripheral firmware
[16, 23, 25], embedded devices [13, 24, 36], or legacy software [35]. That line of work,
which falls under the generic idea of software based attestation is different from ours in
two main differences. First, the setting of firmware attestation uses a different adversarial
model. There, an adversary aims to tamper with the firmware on a peripheral and still
wants to convince an external verifier that the firmware has not been tampered with. In
its attack, the adversary has complete access to the device prior to the execution of the
attestation protocol; the protocol is executed however without adversarial interference.
Our model considers an adversary who can glean only partial information on the state of
the memory prior to its attack, but who acts as man-in-the-middle during the attestation
protocol.
Challenge-response protocols are natural solutions in both situations. Since we aim
for solutions that admit rigorous security proofs we rely on primitives with cryptographic
guarantees. In contrast due to constraints imposed by the application domain solutions
employed peripheral attestation cannot afford to rely on cryptographic primitives. In-
stead, constructions employ carefully crafted check-sum functions where unforgeability
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heuristically relies on timing assumptions and lack of storage space on the device. Jacob-
sson and Johansson [22] show that such assumptions can be grounded in the assumptions
that RAM access is faster than access to the secondary storage [22]. Our work is similar
in its goals with that of Armknecht et al. [3] who provide formal foundations for the area
of software attestation.
More recently, a handful of hardware-based (e.g., coprocessor or trusted chip) at-
testation has been proposed as well: Flicker [29] and TrustVisor [28] using TPM, and
Haven using Intel SGX [21, 30]. Our work differs in that we do not explicitly rely on
hardware assumptions and provides provable security guarantee.
Finally, a recent paper [26] addresses the problem of a virus detection from a provable
security perspective. The authors introduce the virus detection scheme primitive that can
be used to check if computer program has been infected with a virus injecting malicious
code. They describe a compiler, which outputs a protected version of the program that
can run natively on the same machine. The verification is triggered by an external verifier.
Even though the considered problems and the basic idea of spreading the secret shares
are similar, the treatment and the results in [26] are quite different from ours. The major
difference is that the attacker in the security model of [26] is not allowed to learn any
partial information about the secret shares. Our security definition, in turn, does take
partial leakage of the secret into account. Their security definition, however, allows the
attacker to learn the contents of the registers during the attack. This is not a threat in our
setting since the computations happen within the trusted wrapper. Also, their solutions do
not rely on the PKI, which is a plus. The other important difference is that the proposal
in [26] is mostly of theoretical interest (as they rely on leakage-resilient encryption for
which there are no efficient implementations), while our solution is quite efficient. The




$← S denotes that X is selected uniformly at random from S. If A is a randomized
algorithm, then the notation X $←A denotes that X is assigned the outcome of the
experiment of running A, possibly on some inputs. If A is deterministic, we drop the
dollar sign above the arrow. If X,Y are strings, then X‖Y denotes the concatenation
of X and Y . We write L :: a for the list obtained by appending a to the list L and
L[i, . . . , j] for the sublist of L between indexes i and j. We write id for the identity
function (the domain is usually clear from the context) and write US for the uniform
distribution on set S. If n is an integer we write [n] for the set 1, 2, . . . , n. For an integer
k, and a bit b, bk denotes the string consisting of k consecutive “b” bits.
3 Remote Memory Attestation
SYNTAX. We start with defining the abstract functionality of remote memory attestation
(RMA) protocol.
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Definition 1. [RMA protocol] A remote memory attestation protocol is defined by a
tuple of algorithms (SS, Init, (MA,MV), Update, Extract) where:
– The setup algorithm SS takes as input a security parameter 1κ and outputs a pair of
public/secret keys (pk , sk). (SS is run by the verifier.) This output is optional.
– The initialization algorithm Init takes as input a bitstring M (representing the
memory to be protected), a public key pk and the secret key sk and outputs a bitstring
Ms (that represents the protected memory), and a bitstring s (secret information
that one can use to certify the state of the memory).
– The pair of interactive algorithms (MA,MV), run by the prover and verifier resp.,
form the attestation protocol. Algorithm MA takes as inputs the public key pk and
a bitstring Ms and the verifier takes as inputs the secret key sk and secret s. The
verifier outputs a bit, where 1 indicates acceptance, and 0 – rejection.
– The update algorithm Update takes as input a bitstring Ms and outputs a bitstring
Ms
′ (this is a "refreshed" protected memory). It can be ran by the prover at any
point in the execution.
– The Extract algorithm takes as input a bitstring Ms (representing a protected
memory) and outputs a bitstring M (represented the real memory protected in Ms )
and secret s. This is used in the analysis mostly, but also models how the OS can
read the memory.
The correctness condition requires that for every (pk , sk) output by SS, every M ∈
{0, 1}∗, and every (Ms , s) output by Init(M, pk , sk), the second party in (MA(pk ,Ms),
MV(sk , s)) returns 1 with probability 1. Also, Extract(Ms) = (M, s′) for some s′ with
probability 1. These conditions should hold even for an arbitrary number of runs of
Update protocol.
In practice the remote verifier initializes the wrapper with the secret before being sent
to the cloud. The wrapper later acts as the local prover to the remote verifier. In practice
the wrapper is a separate process that gets memory access via ptrace mechanism.
RMA SECURITY. We now formally define the security model for an RMA protocol,
which is part of our main contributions.
We consider an attacker who can read the public key (if any), and can observe the
interactions between the prover and the verifier. The attacker works in two stages. In the
first stage of its attack, it can read arbitrary parts of the memory and can over-write a part
of the memory by injecting data of its choosing. In this phase, the adversary can observe
and interfere with the interaction between the prover and the verifier. This is captured by
giving the adversary access to the oracles that execute the interactive RMA protocol; in
particular, the adversary can chose to observe a legitimate execution of the protocol by
simply forwarding the answers of one oracle to the other. Of course, the adversary can
choose to manipulate the conversation, or even supply inputs of its own choosing. We
only model a single session of the protocol as we do not expect parallel sessions to be
run in practice. Also, at any point, the attacker can request that the shares of the secret
get updated. In the second stage the adversary specifies how it wants to alter the memory
(where and what data it wants to over-write). The memory is modified, one extra update
is performed, and then the attacker can continue its actions allowed in the first stage,
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with the exception that it is not given the ability to read the memory anymore, and this
is the reason we consider two stages of the attacker. This captures the fact noted in the
Introduction, that security is only possible if the memory update procedure is performed
in between the read and write, which can be arbitrary and thus leave the secret intact (by
reading and over-writing it).
We say that the adversary wins if it makes the verifier accept in the second stage,
despite the memory being modified by the attacker. This captures the idea that the verifier
does not notice that the memory has been corrupted.
We observe that it is necessary to restrict the adversary’s abilities, for a couple
of reasons. First, as we mentioned in the Introduction, no security may be possible if
an attacker’s queries are unrestricted. For instance, the adversary may read the whole
memory in between the secret updates or it could read a block and immediately over-
write it maintaining intact the associated secret share. Moreover, note that an adversary
who can over-write memory bit by bit, could eventually learn the whole secret by fixing
each bit for both possible values, one by one and then observing the outcome of the
interaction between the prover and the verifier. In short, no security is possible if we do
not impose (reasonable) restrictions on the adversary.
Second, it seems unlikely that a unique solution suffices to protect against a wide
class of attacks and that different solutions would work for different applications and
classes of attacks. Yet, we would want to avoid providing a diffrent security definition
for each individual scenario.
Accordingly, we state security with respect to abstract classes of functions that
parametrize the read and write queries that model the legitimate read and tamper requests
the attacker can do. This allows our definition to be quite general; we leave it to the
theorem statements for particular protocols and applications to specify these classes and




(pk , sk)← SS
M ← A(pk)
(Ms , s)← Init(M, pk , sk)
g′ ← ARead(·),Tamper(·),MA(pk,Ms ),MV(sk,s),Update




Output 1 iff MV accepts in the 2nd stage
and at that point the first part of Extract(Ms) is not M .
Oracle Read(f):
if f 6∈ L return ⊥
otherwise return f(Ms)
Oracle Tamper(g):
if g 6∈ T return ⊥
Ms ← g(Ms)
Fig. 1: Game defining the security of the memory attestation scheme Π =
(SS, Init, (MA,MV),Update,Extract).
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Definition 2. [RMA scheme security.] Let L and T be two classes of leakage and tam-
pering functions. Consider an RMA protocolΠ = (SS, Init, (MA,MV),Update,Extract).
We define its security via the experiment Exprma-(L,T )A,Π involving the adversary A which
we present in Figure 1.
We call Π secure wrt L and T if for every (possibly restricted) efficient adversary A
the probability that Exprma-(L,T )A,Π returns 1 is negligible in the security parameter.
The design of the above model is influenced directly by studying the practical threats.
In particular, reading memory to leak information has been a prerequisite pretty much
to all attacks from ten years back. Taking the man-in-the-middle attacks into account is
motivated by the observation that even though we trust the cloud provider, we do not
necessarily trust the path between the provider and the client, e.g., when using a cafe’s
wifi. We demand that the secure attestation be done without employing secure channels.
REMARK. Turns out that the practical classes of read and write functions may not
describe the necessary restrictions by themselves. Thus one can further restrict the
adversaries, but again, this is done in the security statements. For instance, security of
our constructions will tolerate any attacker who can read all but one “block” of the
memory and can over-write any arbitrary part of the memory as long as that part is longer
than some minimum number of bits.
4 Building Blocks
REFRESHABLE SECRET SHARING SCHEME. Our schemes rely on an n-out-of-n secret
sharing scheme where one needs all of the shares to reconstruct the secret; any subset of
n− 1 shares is independent from the secret. In addition to the standard property, we also
require that it is possible to refresh shares in such a way that all subsets of n− 1 shares,
each obtained in between updates, are independent of the secret. This property is known
as proactive secret sharing [20]. In addition, we require two more security properties
which we describe later in this section.
Syntax. We first provide the syntax of the secret sharing schemes that we consider.
Definition 3. A refreshable n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme is defined by algorithms
(KS,KR,SU) for sharing and reconstructing a secret, and for refreshing the shares3.
For simplicity we assume that the domain of secrets is {0, 1}κ (where κ is the security
parameter). The sharing algorithm KS takes a secret s and outputs a set (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
of shares4. The reconstruction algorithm KR takes as input a set of shares s1, s2, . . . , sn
and returns a secret s. The update algorithm SU takes as input a set of shares (s1, s2, . . . ,
sn) and returns the updated set (s′1, s
′
2, . . . , s
′
n), a new re-sharing of the same secret.
3 We use the mnemonics KS,KR to indicate that we think of the secret as being some crypto-
graphic key.
4 We do not use the set notation for simplicity.
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For correctness we demand that for any s ∈ {0, 1}κ and any (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
obtained via (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
$← KS(s) it holds that KR((s1, s2, . . . , sn)) = s and
KR(SUi((s1, s2, . . . , sn)) = s with probability 1 for any integer i ≥ 1, where SUi((s1,
s2, . . . , sn)) denotes i consecutive invocations of SU as SU(SU(. . . SU((s1, s2, . . . , sn))
. . .)).
Security. We require that the secret sharing scheme that we use satisfies three security
properties.
SECRET PRIVACY. The most basic one, secret privacy for refreshable secret sharing
scheme (aka proactive secret sharing) guarantees that n − 1 shares do not give the
adversary any information about the secret, and this holds even for an arbitrary number
of updates to each set of shares. The formal definition is in the full version [11].
OBLIVIOUS RECONSTRUCTION. We also require that the scheme enjoys oblivious
reconstruction. Intuitively, this demands that given an adversary who can read and
replace some of the shares, it is possible to determine at any point if the value encoded
in the shares is the same as the original value or not. This property is related but is
different from Verifiable Secret Sharing: the ability to tell that the shares are consistent
with some secret does not necessarily mean that one can tell if transforming a set of
shares to another (valid) one has changed or not the underlying secret.
More formally, fix a secret s ∈ {0, 1}κ and let (s1, s2, . . . , sn) $← KS(s). Con-
sider an adversary who can intermitently issue two types of querries. On a query
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the adversary receives si; on a query (i, v) ∈ ({1, 2, . . . , n} × {0, 1}κ
the value of si is set to v.
We require that there exists a “secret changed?” algorithm SC, formalized in Figure
2, which given the queries made by A and the answers it receives can efficiently decide
(with overwhelming probability) if the value of the secret that is encoded is equal to the




{s1, s2, . . . , sn} ← KS(s)
AShareInfo(·)
b← SC(L)
s′ ← KR(s1, s2, . . . , sn)
return 1 iff
(b = 1 and s = s′) or (b = 0 and s 6= s′)
Oracle ShareInfo(·):
On input i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
L← L :: (i, si)
return si
On input (i, v) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} × {0, 1}κ
L← L :: (i, v)
si ← v
Fig. 2: Experiment defining the oblivious reconstruction property for secret sharing.
SHARE UNPREDICTABILITY. This property demands that for any secret (chosen by
the adversary) and any sharing of the secret, following an Update an adversary cannot
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tamper (in any meaningful way) with any of the resulting fresh shares in a way that does
not alter the secret. This intuition is formalized using the game ExpunpredA,Π in Figure 3.
First,the experiment samples a random secret. After the adversary learns some (but not
all) of the shares, the shares are refreshed, and the adversary needs to tamper with at least
one share. The adversary wins if the secret that is shared stayed unchanged through the
process. We say that Π satisfies share unpredictability if for any adversary which calls
the Read oracle at most n− 1 times and the Tamper oracle at least once, the probability




(s1, s2, . . . , sn)← SU(s1, s2, . . . , sn)
ATamper(·)





Fig. 3: Game defining share unpredictability for for secret sharing. We demand that A
queries his Tamper at least once.
Secure Construction. Here we present a very simple n-out-of-n refreshable secret-
sharing scheme with oblivious reconstructability and argue its security.
Construction 41 [Refreshable secret sharing] We define the scheme (KS,KR,SU) as
follows.
– KS takes secret s ∈ {0, 1}κ, picks si $←{0, 1}κ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, computes
sn ← s⊕ s1 ⊕ . . .⊕ sn−1
– KR on input (s1, . . . , sn) returns s1 ⊕ . . .⊕ sn
– SU takes (s1, . . . , sn) and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, computes ri $←{0, 1}κ, si $← si ⊕ ri.
Finally, sn ← sn ⊕ r1 ⊕ . . .⊕ rn−1, and SU returns (s1, . . . , sn).
It is immediate to see that the above scheme is correct. The following theorem states
(information-theoretic) security. The proof is in the full version [11].
Theorem 1. The scheme of Construction 41 is a refreshable secret sharing scheme with
secret privacy, oblivious reconstructability and share unpredictability.
IND-PCA SECURE ENCRYPTION. Our second construction uses a (labeled) encryption
scheme that satisfies indistinguishability under plaintext-checking attacks (IND-PCA)
[32]. One concrete scheme which satisfies IND-PCA security is the "Short" Cramer-
Shoup (SCS) scheme proposed by Abdalla et al. [1]. We recall the primitive and the
scheme in the full version [11]. The following result about IND-PCA security of the
SCS scheme is by Abdalla et al. [1].
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Theorem 2. Under the DDH assumption onG and assuming thatH is a target collision
resistant hash function, the SCS scheme by Abdalla et al. [1] is IND-PCA.
5 RMA Constructions
We are now ready to present two constructions of an RMA protocol for a limited, but
quite practical class of attacks. The first construction combines a secret sharing scheme
with a hash function, and does not rely on public key cryptography. The scheme is quite
efficient and is secure in the random oracle model; the second construction uses a public
key encryption scheme secure under plaintext checking attacks.
Both construction share the same underlying idea. A secret is shared and the resulting
shares are placed in the memory. In our construction we assume that shares are at equal
distance – other options are possible provided that this placement ensures that tampering
with the memory (using the tampering functions provided to the RMA adversary) does
tamper with these protective shares. The attestation protocol is challenge response: the
verifier selects a random nonce and sends it to the prover. Upon receiving the nonce, the
prover collects the shares, reconstructs the secret and uses it in a cryptographic operation;
the verifier then confirms that the secret used is the same that he holds.
In the first scheme, which we present below, the prover hashes the secret together
with the nonce and sends it to the verifier who checks consistency with his locally stored
secret by and the nonce he has sent.
5.1 Hash-based RMA
Construction 51 [Hash-based RMA.] Fix a a refreshable n-out-of-n secret sharing
scheme SSh = (KS,KR,SU). Let Divide be any function that on input a bitstring
of size greater than n breaks M into n consecutive substrings (M1, . . . ,Mn). Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}h be a hash function. These scheme does not use asymmetric
keys for the parties so below we omit them from the description of the algorithms. We
define the RMA protocol hash2rma(H) by the algorithms (SS, Init, (MA,MV),Update,
Extract) below:
– SS(1k) returns .
– Init on input M does
• s $←{0, 1}κ
• (s1, . . . , sn)← KS(n, s)
• (M1, . . . ,Mn)← Divide(M)
• Return (M1‖s1‖ . . . ‖Mn‖sn, s).
– Extract on input Ms parses Ms as M1‖s1‖ . . . ‖Mn‖sn, runs s← KR(s1, . . . , sn)
and returns (M, s).
– MV on input s picks l $←{0, 1}l(κ) and sends l to MA
– MA on input Ms gets l from MV, calculates (M, s) ← Extract(Ms), and sends
back t = H(s||l).
– MV gets t from MA returns the result of the comparison t = H(s||l).
– Update on input Ms Ms as M1‖s1‖ . . . ‖Mn‖sn and returns SU(s1, . . . , sn).
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The following theorem states the security guarantees the above construction provides
– the details of the proof are in the full version of the paper [11].
Theorem 3. Let SSh = (KS,KR,SU) be an n-out-of-n refreshable secret sharing
scheme. Let Divide be any function that on input a bitstring M , which for simplicity
we assume is nm bits, breaks M into n consecutive substrings (M1, . . . ,Mn). Let
hash2rma(H) = (SS, Init, (MA,MV), Update, Extract) be the hash-based RMA proto-
col as per Construction 51.
Let L be the class of functions that on inputs integers a, b such that 1 ≤ a < b ≤ m,
returns Ms [a . . . b]. Let T be the class of functions that on inputs an index 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and bitstring c of size m+ k returns Ms with its ith block changed to c.
Let us call the adversary restricted if during all its queries to Read and Tamper
oracles between the Update queries, there is a substring of Ms of length at least n,
which has not been read, i.e., not returned by Read.
Then if SSh has secret privacy, oblivious reconstructability and share unpredictabil-
ity then hash2rma(H) is secure wrt L and T and the adversaries restricted as above, in
the random oracle model.
We remark that while our protocol descriptions and treatment assume that the shares
are embedded into the memory over equal intervals for simplicity, our implementations
use blocks of increasing size, for systems functionality purposes. Our security analyses
still apply though. This is because it is clear how the read and tamper queries correspond
to reading and tampering the shares, and in addition, any tampering query to a memory
part that has not been read must change the secret.
We justify the restrictions in the security statement from the systems point of view.
We require that an attacker does not read the whole memory. This is reasonable, as
reading incorrect memory address results in segmentation fault (e.g., termination of the
process). Given that 64-bit address of modern processors, it’s unlikely that attackers
infer the whole memory space.
Since our threat model is not arbitrary memory write: rather a consecutive memory
overrun like buffer overflow, it is natural to assume in this threat model an attacker needs
to over-write the boundary between the blocks.
Given that the memory randomization is a common defense (outside of our model
though), attackers should correctly identify the location of shares to overwrite (which is
randomized), hence we do not model completely arbitrary writes.
5.2 Encryption-based RMA
The construction is based on a similar idea as that underlying the hash-based RMA
protocol above. The difference is in the attestation and verification algorithms. Instead of
the hash, the prover computes and sends the encryption of the secret currently encoded
in the memory with the nonce sent by the verifier as label.
Construction 52 [Encryption-based RMA.] Let SSh = (KS,KR,SU) and Divide
be as in Construction 51. Let Π = (KeyGen, Enc,Dec) be a labeled asymmetric
encryption scheme. The RMA scheme enc2rma(Π) is defined by
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– SS(1κ) runs (pk , sk) $←KeyGen(1κ) and returns (pk , sk)
– Init is as in Construction 51.
– Extract on input Ms parses Ms as M1‖s1‖ . . . ‖Mn‖sn, runs s← KR(s1, . . . , sn)
and returns (M, s).
– MV on input s picks l $←{0, 1}l(κ) and sends l to MA
– MA on input Ms gets l from MV and does
• (M, s1, . . . , sn)← Extract(Ms),
• C $←Encl(s) and
• send C to the verifier.
– MV on input C calculates s′ ← Decl(C) and returns the result of s ?= s′.
– The Update algorithm is as in Construction 51.
The intuition behind security of the construction is as follows. The prover sends the
encrypted secret (for some label chosen by the verifier) to the verifier; the goal of the
adversary is to (eventually) create a new ciphertext of the same secret under a new label
received from the verifier. If this is possible, a plaintext-checking oracle would allow to
distinguish such an encryption from the encryption of a different secret. The following
proposition establishes the security of the above construction. The proof is in [11].
Theorem 4. If SSh is a refreshable secret sharing scheme with secret privacy, oblivious
reconstructability and share unpredictability and Π = (KeyGen, Enc,Dec) is an IND-
PCA secure then enc2rma(Π) defined by Construction 52 is a secure RMA scheme with
respect to L, T and any efficient but restricted adversary defined in Theorem 3.
OPTIMIZATION. The above theorem establishes that we can instantiate an RMA scheme
using the SCS scheme that we presented in Section 4. It turns out that we can further
optimize the communication complexity of that protocol (where each interaction requires
the prover to send three group elements) by observing that the verifier already has the
plaintext that the ciphertext it receives should contain. In this case, the prover does not
have to send the second component of the ciphertext (as this component can actually be
recomputed by the verifier using its secret key). For completeness, we give below the
relevant algorithms of the optimized scheme.
Construction 53 [SCS-based RMA.]
– SS(1κ) obtains G and (h, c, d), (x, a, b, a′, b′) by running KeyGenSCS(1κ).
– MV on input s picks l $←{0, 1}l(κ) and sends l to MA
– MA on input Ms and (h, c, d) gets l from MV, obtains the shares of the secret
via (M, s1, . . . , sn) ← Extract(Ms), and samples random coins r ∈ [|G|] and
computes (u = gr, e = hr ·m, v = (c · dα)r), where α = H(l, u, e). It sends (u, v)
to the server.
– MV on input its secret key (x, a, b, a′, b′) the challenge l and secret s operates as
follows on input (u, v) from the prover and returns the result of the comparison
v = ua+αa
′ · (ux)b+αb′ , where α = H(l, u, ux · s).
The following security statement follows directly from Theorem 4 and Theorem 2.
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Theorem 5. If SSh is a refreshable secret sharing scheme with secret privacy, oblivious
reconstructability and share unpredictability, and Π = (KeyGen, Enc,Dec) is as
per Construction 52 then the RMA protocol defined by Construction 53 is a secure
RMA scheme with respect to L, T and any efficient but restricted adversary defined in
Theorem 3, assuming the DDH problem is hard in the underlying group and the hash is
target collision-resistant.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
Our prototype can seamlessly enable the remote memory attestation in any applica-
tions that are using standard libraries. At runtime, the prototype implementation inter-
poses all memory allocations (malloc()) and deallocations (free()) by incorporating
LD_PRELOAD when the application starts executing. Before the application runs, our
custom runtime pre-allocates memory regions with varying sizes, and carefully insert
key shares between the memory objects.
Specifically, we provide a simple wrapper program (called prover) which end users
use to perform all these operations. When requested, the prover launches the program,
and then inserts our custom library for memory allocations of the target application.
Before the program starts, the prover pre-allocates a list of chuncked memory, starting
from 8 bytes object to a few mega bytes (128 MB by default) incrementally. In our
current prototype, we pre-allocate N blocks (configurable, 10 by default) per size (e.g.,
N 8-byte blocks up to 128 MB).
For attestation, the prover initiates the secrets with the public key provided, performs
the memory attestation of the program it launched, and communicates with the remote
verifier. To access the memory of a remote program, it attaches to the program via
ptrace interface in UNIX-like operating system, and runs the protocol.
Component Lines of code
Verifier 298 lines of C
Prover 638 lines of C
Memory allocator 343 lines of C
Total 1,279 lines of code
Fig. 4: The complexity of RMA in terms of lines of code of each components, including
verifier, launcher and memory allocator.
We evaluate a prototype of RMA in three aspects: 1) runtime overheads of computation-
oriented tasks such as SPEC benchmark; 2) worst case overheads (e.g., launching an
application) that end-user might be facing when using RMA; 3) break-down of per-
formance overheads and data transferred on the course of remote attestation by using
our prototype. We performed all experiments with the prototype implementation of the
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Programs Baseline (s) RMA (s) Overhead (%)
400.perlbench 545 566 3.9%
401.bzip2 749 770 2.8%
403.gcc 521 537 3.1%
429.mcf 385 395 2.6%
445.gobmk 691 691 0.0%
456.hmmer 638 665 4.2%
458.sjeng 779 805 3.3%
462.libquantu 1,453 1,514 4.2%
464.h264ref 917 950 3.6%
471.omnetpp 540 547 1.3%
473.astar 606 635 4.8%
483.xalancbmk 361 373 3.3%
Fig. 5: Runtime overheads of SPEC benchmark programs with RMA.
encryption-based RMA. As we mentioned in the Introduction, this protocol is not as
efficient (in terms of crypto operations) as the hash-based one, but it provides stronger
security (no reliance on the random oracle model), and performs equally well in the
presence of system-dependent overheads.
MICRO-BENCHMARK. We evaluate a prototype of RMA by running the standard SPEC
CPU2006 integer benchmark suite. All benchmarks were run on Intel Xeon CPU E7-4820
@2.00GHz machine with 128 GB RAM, and the baseline benchmark ran with standard
libraries provided by Ubuntu 15.04 with Linux 3.19.0-16. As shown in Figure 5, due to
the simplicity of the implementation, RMA incurs negligible performance overheads to
SPEC benchmark programs: 3.1% on average, ranging from 0.0% to 4.8% depending on
a SEPC benchmark program. During the experiments, we found out that the significant
part of performance overheads comes from the implementation of the custom memory
allocator and the side-effects of memory fragmentation, thereby diluting the overheads
related to crypto operations. We believe that different types of applications requiring
frequent validation or updates of share keys might need better optimization of crypto-
related software stack. It is worth noting that our prototype never focuses on optimization
in any sort (e.g., using a coarse-grained, global lock to support multi-threading) and the
overall performance can be dramatically improved if necessary.
MACRO-BENCHMARK. To measure performance overhands that end-user might be
encountering when using RMA, we construct a macro-benchmark with three applications
for four different tasks; launching a web browser (Firefox), an email client (Thunderbird),
compressing and decompressing files (Tar). All experiments were conducted on a laptop
running Ubuntu 12.04 with standard glibc library (Ubuntu/Linaro 4.6.3-1ubuntu5),
and we measured each benchmark ten times, we provide the summary in [11]. iNote
that launching application is the worst-case scenario to RMA because it has to allocate
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memory space at program’s startup and initiate all key shares before executing the
program. According to our benchmark, it incurs acceptable performance overheads
even in the worst-cast construction, but we believe the latency that users actually feel is
minimal: 0.023s in Firefox and 0.199s in Thunderbird.
PERFORMANCE BREAK-DOWN. We also measured how long it takes to proceed each
stage of the RMA protocol with our prototype implementation. We measured the amount
of data that needs to be transferred as well. In short, it is feasible to implement the pro-
posed RMA protocol in practice: our unoptimized system incurs negligible performance
overheads (the details are in [11]) and the amount of messages between the prover and
the verifier is minimal (e.g., 12 bytes up to 396 bytes). According to our evaluation, we
believe our RMA protocol can be utilized in an efficient manner in practice.
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